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Abstract—We propose a methodology for designing dependable
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) by extending the concepts
of understandability, correctness, and validity that are crucial
ingredients in existing certification standards. We apply the
concept in a concrete case study in designing a high-way ANN-
based motion predictor to guarantee safety properties such as
impossibility for the ego vehicle to suggest moving to the right
lane if there exists another vehicle on its right.
Index Terms—autonomous driving, neural network, depend-
ability, certification, formal verification, research challenges
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent burst of applying artificial neural network (ANN)
technologies has created an impact on applications such as
autonomous driving. Although using ANN-based techniques
had shown great promise (e.g., substantially superior image
recognition [6]) compared to classical approaches, there have
been huge barriers in using neural networks in safety critical
domains (e.g., report from NASA [2]).
In this paper, we propose a methodology for enabling
the usage of ANN by considering reasonable extensions for
existing safety standards (Sec. II). We examine the technology
readiness of our proposed methodology by applying a case
study regarding highway motion prediction for autonomous
driving (Sec. III), and address further research needs (Sec. IV).
II. CERTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEPENDABLE
NEURAL NETWORKS
For certification of safety critical systems, safety is estab-
lished by rigorous engineering processes (i.e., these processes
are defined in a way such that engineering complying to
these processes can eliminate or prevent errors). Although
it is more process-oriented than function-oriented, the basic
principle of (1) ensuring that the specification is correct and (2)
ensuring that an implementation satisfies the specification is
well perceived. Table I summarizes three critical aspects over
the underlying intention of certifying safety-critical systems,
namely specification validity, implementation understandabil-
ity, and implementation correctness.
• The validity of specification is important to ensure that
one “builds the right system”. Several methods can be
used in this regard, such as prototyping, design-time
analysis and reviews, or product acceptance tests.
• The well-behaving of an implementation is captured by
two aspects: (1) understandability via requirement-to-
code traceability, and (2) correctness via extensive testing,
with coverage criterion such as Modified Condition /
Decision Coverage (MC/DC).
Although these approaches are valid for classical engineering
using V-models, applying them on neural networks has created
the following issues:
• (Black-box structure) For ANN-based systems, im-
plementations consist of layers of neurons operating
on and transforming high-dimensional vectors. This
makes understandability arguments such as fine-grained
requirement-to-code traceability difficult.
• (Testing for correctness claims) Depending on the acti-
vation function, applying traditional coverage-based ap-
proaches makes the system testing either trivially satis-
fiable or almost intractable. (i) When one uses tan−1
as the activation function, one only needs one test case
to satisfy MC/DC as there is no if-then-else branch in
every neuron. (ii) When one uses ReLU as the activation
function, every neuron contains an if-then-else statement.
MC/DC is then intractable, as branching possibilities are
exponential to the number of neurons.
• (Implicit specification) For implementing systems using
ANNs, the specification refers to a combination of data
(which specifies input-output behaviors) as well as clas-
sical specifications for domain knowledge such as traffic
or safety rules. The “specification knowledge” inside the
data is implicit, compared to cases such as traffic rules.
Based on the above issues, Table I further summarizes our
considered additions towards safety certification of ANNs.
(A) (Neuron-to-feature understandability) One should provide
confidence regarding the meaning of a neural network by
associating individual neurons with conditions (features)
when it can be activated.
(B) (From testing to formal analysis) The result of certifica-
tion should provide (best effort) correctness claims over
the (partially incomplete) classical specification, such as
obeying traffic rules or ensuring road safety. As testing
approaches its limitation, we suggest to apply formal
methods such as static analysis or symbolic reasoning.
(C) (Validating the “new specification”) One needs to check
the validity of the data, to ensure that only sanitized
data will be used in training. For examples such as
autonomous driving, one needs to enhance raw data with
sure guarantees such as no data containing risky driving
has been introduced for training the maneuver of vehicles.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
00
91
1v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  4
 Se
p 2
01
7
TABLE I
EXTENDING THE CONCEPT IN CERTIFY SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES BROUGHT BY NEURAL NETWORKS.
Implementation Existing standard Fine-grained specification-to-code traceability
understandability Adaptation for ANN (+) Fine-grained neuron-to-feature traceability
Implementation Existing standard Verification based on testing and classical coverage criteria such as MC/DC
correctness Adaptation for ANN (−) coverage criteria such as MC/DC
(+) formal analysis against safety properties
Specification Existing standard Validation via prototyping, design-time analysis, validity and product acceptance test
validity Adaptation for ANN (+) Validating data as a new type of specification
Fig. 1. Simulation of the vehicle (left) and the switch-lane motion suggested
by the neural network (right).
III. CASE STUDY: HIGHWAY MOTION PREDICTION FOR
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
We outline how we applied the strategy above in verifying
a highway overtaking ANN-based motion predictor used in
autonomous driving (developed by Lenz et al. [7]). Figure 1
provides a snapshot on the simulation of the vehicle.
In Figure 1, the ANN-based predictor takes three categories
of inputs: (i) its own speed profile, (ii) parameters of its nearest
surrounding vehicles for each orientation, and (iii) the road
condition. The total number of input variables to the network
is 84. Given the current state of the perceived environment,
it produces in real-time the probability distribution over all
possible actions for a vehicle, characterized as a Gaussian
mixture model. The action of the ego vehicle is decomposed
into two parts: (i) indicator over possible lateral velocity
(i.e., if it is feasible to switch lanes), and (ii) indicator over
longitudinal acceleration (i.e., if it is feasible to accelerate).
In Figure 1, the motion predictor on the right suggests to
slightly decelerate and to switch to left lanes, as the generated
Gaussian mixture is within the lower left part.
One of the most critical safety requirements is to ensure
that if there is a vehicle in the left of the ego vehicle, the
predictor never suggests a large left velocity to the ego vehicle;
when such a scenario occurs, it may lead to crashes. In this
example, it is regulated that the mean value of the probability
distribution should be limited to certain threshold.
Once we validated that the training data never contains
such inputs (as in Sec. II (A)), we perform formal verification
(as in Sec. II (B)) following the methodology developed by
Cheng et al. [3], which encodes the structure of a neural
TABLE II
RESULTS OF VERIFYING ANN-BASED MOTION PREDICTORS.
ANN maximum lateral velocity, when
exists a vehicle in the left
verification
time
I4×10 0.688497 5.4s
I4×20 0.467385 549.1s
I4×25 2.10916 28.2s
I4×40 1.95859 645.9s
I4×50 1.72781 13351.2s
I4×60 n.a. (unable to find maximum) time-out
I4×60 Prove that the lateral velocity can
never be larger than 3m
s
11059.8s
network into a set of mixed integer linear constraints. With the
technology we are able to successfully verify safety properties.
Surprisingly, we have trained a couple of neural networks
under the same data, but not all of them can guarantee the
safety property (see Fig. II for a summary of verification
results, being experimented on a Google VM with 12 Cores).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposed certification methodology, during the case
study, has also indicated further research needs.
(i) During the study, we found that implementation under-
standability can only be partially achieved by technolo-
gies such as deconvolution [8].
(ii) Scalability of automated verification requires improve-
ment (cf. Table II for required verification time). Recent
results on quantized neural networks [5] might make
verification more scalable via an encoding to bitvector
theories in SMT [4].
(iii) Apart from verification, another important direction is to
consider training under known properties on the target
function (known as hints [1]), such as safety rules.
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